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ABSTRACT 
How do different exporters react to exchange rate changes? 
Theory, empirics and aggregate implications 
This paper analyzes the reaction of exporters to exchange rate changes. We 
present a model where, in the presence of distribution costs in the export 
market, high and low productivity firms react differently to a depreciation . 
Whereas high productivity firms optimally raise their markup rather than the 
volume they export, low productivity firms choose the opposite strategy. 
Hence, pricing to market is both endogenous and heterogenous. This 
heterogeneity has important consequences for the aggregate impact of 
exchange rate movements. The presence of fixed costs to export means that 
only high productivity firms can export, firms which precisely react to an 
exchange rate depreciation by increasing their export price rather than their 
sales. We show that this selection effect can explain the weak impact of 
exchange rate movements on aggregate export volumes. We then test the 
main predictions of the model on a very rich French firm level data set with 
destination-specific export values and volumes on the period 1995-2005. Our 
results confirm that high performance firms react to a depreciation by 
increasing their export price rather than their export volume. The reverse is 
true for low productivity exporters. Pricing to market by exporters is also more 
pervasive in sectors and destination countries with higher distribution costs. 
Consistent with our theoretical framework, we show that the probability of 
firms to enter the export market following a depreciation increases. The 
extensive margin response to exchange rate changes is modest at the 
aggregate level because firms that enter, following a depreciation, are smaller 
relative to existing firms.  
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the reaction of exporters to exchange rate changes. We present a model
where, in the presence of distribution costs in the export market, high and low produc-
tivity ﬁrms react diﬀerently to a depreciation . Whereas high productivity ﬁrms optimally
raise their markup rather than the volume they export, low productivity ﬁrms choose the
opposite strategy. Hence, pricing to market is both endogenous and heteroegenous. This
heterogeneity has important consequences for the aggregate impact of exchange rate move-
ments. The presence of ﬁxed costs to export means that only high productivity ﬁrms can
export, ﬁrms which precisely react to an exchange rate depreciation by increasing their ex-
port price rather than their sales. We show that this selection eﬀect can explain the weak
impact of exchange rate movements on aggregate export volumes. We then test the main
predictions of the model on a very rich French ﬁrm level data set with destination-speciﬁc
export values and volumes on the period 1995-2005. Our results conﬁrm that high perfor-
mance ﬁrms react to a depreciation by increasing their export price rather than their export
volume. The reverse is true for low productivity exporters. Pricing to market by exporters
is also more pervasive in sectors and destination countries with higher distribution costs.
Consistent with our theoretical framework, we show that the probability of ﬁrms to enter
the export market following a depreciation increases. The extensive margin response to ex-
change rate changes is modest at the aggregate level because ﬁrms that enter, following a
depreciation, are smaller relative to existing ﬁrms.
1 Introduction
Movements of nominal and real exchange rates are large. They however seem to have little
eﬀect on aggregate variables such as import prices, consumer prices, and the volumes of
imports and exports. The sensitivity, or rather lack of, of prices to exchange rate movements
has been well documented by Goldberg and Knetter (1997) and Campa and Goldberg (2005
and 2008) who provide estimates of the pass-through of exchange rates into import prices.
There is also evidence indicating a decline in exchange rate pass-through to import prices
in the U.S. On the quantity side, the elasticity of aggregate exports to real exchange rate
movements is typically found to be low in industrialized countries, a bit below unity for
example in Hooper, Johnson, and Marquez (2000) and above unity but rarely above 2 in
others studies. In international real business cycle models, the elasticity used for simulations
is typically between 0.5 and 2.
One possible explanation is that prices are rigid in the currency of the export market.
However, Campa and Goldberg, (2005) show that the incomplete pass-through of exchange
rate changes into import prices is far from being a short-term phenomenon as it remains
after one year. This suggests that price rigidities cannot fully explain this phenomenon.
Moreover, Gopinath and Rigobon (2008) have recently shown on good-level data, that even
conditioning on a price change, trade weighted exchange rate pass-through into U.S. import
prices is low, at 22%. Another explanation is the presence of local distribution costs. These
can directly explain why consumer prices do not respond fully to exchange rate movements.
Corsetti and Dedola (2007) show that with imperfect competition, distribution costs may
also explain why import prices themselves do not respond much to exchange rate movements.
In this paper, we show that the heterogeneity of the optimal response of exporters to
exchange rate movements can help explain the lack of response of aggregate variables (prices
and quantities) to these movements. We show theoretically and empirically that high and
low performance ﬁrms react very diﬀerently to exchange rate movements. We interpret
performance in terms of productivity or, in an alternative version of the model, in terms
of quality. Whereas, following a depreciation, high performance ﬁrms optimally raise their
markup rather than the volume they export, low performance ﬁrms choose the opposite
strategy. Another way to state this result is that high performance ﬁrms absorb exchange
rate movements in their markups but low performance ﬁrms do not. The reason is that,
due to local distribution costs, the demand elasticity perceived by high performance ﬁrms
is lower than the elasticity perceived by low performance ones. This heterogeneity is a novel
ﬁnding and is also interesting because of its implications for aggregate eﬀects of exchange
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rate movements. In our model, following the spirit of Melitz (2003), ﬁxed export costs
generate a selection mechanism through which only the best performers are able to export.
Also, heterogeneity in productivity implies that a very large share of aggregate exports is
made by a small portion of high performance ﬁrms. Hence, exporters, and even more so big
exporters, are, by this selection eﬀect, ﬁrms which optimally choose to absorb exchange rate
movements in their markups. A depreciation also leads new ﬁrms to enter the export market
but these are less productive and smaller than existing ones. We show that our model, with
suﬃcient heterogeneity in productivity, can indeed reproduce the observed low level of the
elasticity of the intensive and extensive margins of trade to exchange rate movements.
The model produces testable implications on the heterogeneity of the sensitivity of ﬁrm
level export prices and volumes to exchange rates. We test these predictions on a very rich
ﬁrm-level dataset. We collected information on ﬁrm-level, destination-speciﬁc export values
and volumes from the French Customs and other information on ﬁrm performance at annual
frequency. This is the same source as the one used by Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2008)
for the year 1986. We use this data set for a longer and more recent period (1995-2005)
so that we can exploit variation across both years and destinations1 . To our knowledge,
our paper is the ﬁrst to exploit such detailed data to document the reaction of ﬁrms to
exchange rate movements in terms of prices, quantities, entry and exit and to analyze how
diﬀerent ﬁrms react diﬀerently to exchange rate movements. A big advantage of our dataset
is that we have information that can proxy for the FOB price at the producer/destination
level. We can infer the impact of a depreciation on the pricing strategy of the exporter.
Our paper is therefore complementary to existing studies on pricing to market and pass-
through which use information that proxies pricing strategies of exporters through import
prices2 (which contain transport costs) or consumer prices3 (which also contain distribution
costs). We ﬁrst show that ﬁrms with performance (measured by TFP, labor productivity,
export size, number of destinations) above the median react to a 10% depreciation by
increasing their (destination speciﬁc) export price in euro by around 2%. In contrast, those
ﬁrms below median performance do not change export prices in reaction to a change in
exchange rate. Hence, only high performance partially price to market and partially absorb
exchange rate movements in their mark-ups. On export volumes (again destination speciﬁc),
the reverse is true: for the best performers export volumes do not react to exchange rate
1Berthou and Fontagné (2008a, and b) use this same data set to analyze the eﬀect of the creation of the
euro on the exports of French ﬁrms.
2See for example Gopinath and Itskhoki (2008), Gopinath, Itskhoki and Rigobon (2009), Halpern and
Koren (2008).
3See Crucini and Shintani (2008) and Gopinath, Gourinchas, Hsieh and Li (2009) for example.
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movements but poor performers react by increasing their export volumes by around 6%.
We also ﬁnd that, following a depreciation, French exporters selling in sectors and countries
with high distribution costs, choose to increase their mark-up rather than their export
volumes. Distribution costs in the destination market therefore change the pricing strategy
of exporters towards more pricing to market. Again, this is consistent with our theoretical
framework and with the model of Corsetti and Dedola (2007).
To our knowledge, our paper is also the ﬁrst to document the impact of exchange rate
changes on entry and exit in diﬀerent destinations. The model predicts entry of ﬁrms follow-
ing a depreciation4 We ﬁnd that this is indeed the case for French ﬁrms and, surprisingly,
that this entry takes place relatively quickly, within a year. The extensive margin represents
around 20% of the total increase in exports. However, because the new entrants are on
average smaller than existing exporters, the extensive margin of exchange rate movements
on exports has a limited eﬀect at the aggregate level.
Consistently with the existing literature, we ﬁnd that the aggregate elasticity of exports
to exchange rate is low, a little bit above unity. We show that with suﬃcient heterogeneity
and plausible distribution costs margins, our model, in the absence of nominal rigidities,
can reproduce the observed low aggregate elasticities at both the intensive and extensive
margins. Empirically, and consistent with the key role of heterogeneity in our model, we
also ﬁnd that sectors with more heterogenous ﬁrms are those for which aggregate export
volumes are the least sensitive to exchange rate movements.
At the origin of our results is the interaction between two key elements recently em-
phasized by the international trade and macroeconomics literatures. The ﬁrst element is
productivity heterogeneity across ﬁrms which has been theoretically analyzed by Melitz
(2003) and Chaney (2008) in the trade context. Several papers have documented the fact
that ﬁrms that export have higher productivity and perform better than other ﬁrms more
generally (see for the French case, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004 and 2008)). This
is due to the existence of ﬁxed costs of exports that allows only high performers to export.
Moreover, a very large share of exports is concentrated on a small number of ﬁrms, the
best performers among the exporters (see Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott 2007 and
Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). The second element is local distributions costs that have to
be paid by ﬁrms to reach consumers. Evidence of the signiﬁcance of these costs have been
found by Goldberg and Campa (2008) and previously emphasized by Anderson and Van
Wincoop (2004) among others; they are generally found to constitute a 40 to 60 percent
4Bernard, Eaton, Jensen and Kortum (2003), in a theoretical model with ﬁrm heterogeneity, entry and
exit ﬁnd that an appreciation leads some of the ﬁrms to stop exporting.
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share of consumer prices. Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003) report that distribution costs
represent more than 40 percent of the retail price in the US and 60 percent of the retail
price in Argentina. We show in this paper that the interaction of ﬁrms’ heterogeneity and
local distribution costs generate heterogenous optimal response to exchange rate changes in
terms of prices (heterogenous pricing to market) and quantities.
Our paper is related to the literature on incomplete exchange rate pass-through and
pricing to market. A recent paper by Auer and Chaney (2008) shows that the pass-through
can be incomplete and heterogeneous across goods of diﬀerent quality in a model with
heterogenous consumers. Our paper is also related to the papers (Corsetti and Dedola, 2007
and Atkeson and Burstein, 2008) which have analyzed the impact of distribution costs on
the extent of the pass-through. Indeed, in our model, local distribution costs directly lower
the pass-through to consumer prices but also generate variable producer mark-ups as in
Corsetti and Dedola (2007) that further reduce the pass-through.
Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003) analyze the role of nontradable distribution costs in
accounting for the behavior of international relative prices. and show that because distribu-
tion services require local labor, they drive a natural wedge between retail prices in diﬀerent
countries. Burstein, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2005) show that distribution costs are also
key to understand the large drop in real exchange rates that occurs after large devaluations.
In the theoretical contribution of Atkeson and Burstein (2008), distribution costs also play
an important role to explain deviations from relative purchasing power parity in a model
with imperfect competition and variable markups. The model they present is the closest
to ours because they show that in the presence of trade costs and imperfect competition
large ﬁrms have an incentive to price to market. Hence, heterogeneity across ﬁrms features
prominently in their analysis of pricing to market and deviations from PPP. Diﬀerent from
Atkeson and Burstein (2008), we focus on both prices and quantities and the mechanism
we analyze in our theoretical contribution depends on the interaction between heterogeneity
in productivity and local distribution costs. In addition, we test our predictions on a very
detailed ﬁrm-level dataset for both prices and quantities. Our empirical results on prices are
consistent with several aspects of their theoretical model, in particular the fact that ﬁrms
diﬀer in the degree to which they price to market and that this heterogeneity may have
important aggregate consequences. Two other related papers are Dekle, Jeong and Ryoo
(2007) and Imbs and Mejean (2009) who show that the aggregation of heterogenous ﬁrms
or sectors can result into an aggregation bias in the estimation of the elasticity of exports
to exchange rate changes. Their ﬁrm and sector level analysis concludes that estimates of
the elasticity parameter at the ﬁrm or sector and at the (consistently) aggregated levels are
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similar.
There are few empirical contributions on pricing to market, exchange rate and export
ﬂows using exporter-level data5 . Martin and Rodriguez (2004) ﬁnd that Spanish ﬁrms do
react to a depreciation by raising their mark up. Hellerstein (2008) uses a detailed dataset
with retail and wholesale prices for beer and ﬁnds that markup adjustments by manufac-
turers and retailers explain roughly half of the incomplete pass-through whereas local costs
components account for the other half. Gaulier, Lahrèche-Révil and Méjean (2006) show,
using product-level data, that pricing to market is more pervasive when the goods are traded
on referenced markets and for ﬁnal consumption goods. Their study stresses strong hetero-
geneity in pricing to market across products. Bernard, Jensen an Schott (2006) show that
multinationals diﬀerentially adjust their prices inside and outside the ﬁrm in response to
exchange rate movements. Fitzgerald and Haller (2008) use an Irish ﬁrm level data set and
show that, conditioning on goods being invoiced in destination currency and observing a
price change, mark-ups move one-for-one with movements of the exchange rate. However,
these studies do not analyze how and why diﬀerent ﬁrms react diﬀerently to an exchange
rate movement and how their sales and entry/exit decision are aﬀected which is the focus of
our paper. Using British data, Greenaway, Kneller and Zhang (2007) analyze the exporter
status choice following exchange rate variations but they do not have information on export
destination, nor on the pricing strategy of ﬁrms.
The paper is organized as follows. We derive the main theoretical results and predictions
in the next section. Section 3 presents the data set, the empirical methodology and the main
ﬁndings. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 Preferences and technology
We analyze a simple model in which heterogenous ﬁrms of a country (called Home) export
to  countries. The aim is to derive testable implications concerning the impact of ex-
change rate movements on exporters behavior. In the empirical section, where we test those
5Other papers analyze diﬀerent aspects of ﬁrms reactions to exchange rate shocks. Gourinchas (1999),
evaluates the impact of exchange rate ﬂuctuations on inter- and intra-sectoral job reallocation. The pa-
per investigates empirically the pattern of job creation and destruction in response to real exchange rate
movements in France between 1984 and 1992, using disaggregated ﬁrm-level data and ﬁnds that traded-
sector industries are very responsive to real exchange rate movements. Ekholm, Moxnes and Ullveit-Moe
(2008) study ﬁrms’ response to the appreciation of the Norwegian Krone in the early 2000s with respect to
employment, productivity, and oﬀshoring.
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implications, the exporter country will be France. For notational simplicity, given that we
concentrate on one exporter country (Home), we drop subscripts that describe this country.
There is only one sector which operates under monopolistic competition.
The origin of the movements in the bilateral real exchange rates with each  countries
will be left exogenous but could be made endogenous either by introducing monetary shocks
that move the nominal exchange rate under the assumption of rigid nominal wages or pro-
ductivity shocks in a non tradeable sector. Corsetti and Dedola (2007) analyze both in a
general equilibrium model. Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008)
focus on productivity shocks. We prefer to remain agnostic on the origin of real exchange
rate movements in short-medium term horizon (around one year) on which we will focus
in the empirical section. One reason is the failure of the empirical literature to ﬁnd an im-
portant role for fundamentals (monetary or real) to real exchange rate movements on this
horizon. Another is that one aim of our model is to derive testable implications of the eﬀect
of exchange rate movements at the ﬁrm level, a level at which we can take these movements
as exogenous.
Utility for a representative agent in country  is derived from consumption of a continuum
of diﬀerentiated varieties in the standard Dixit-Stiglitz framework:
() =
⎡
⎣
Z

()1−1
⎤
⎦
1
1−1
(1)
where () is the consumption of variety . Firms are indexed by  which represents their
productivity (1 is the number of units of labor necessary for producing the good). As will
be seen below,  also aﬀects the ﬁxed cost of production in the country where the ﬁrm is
located. The set of traded varieties is . The elasticity of substitution between two varieties
is   1
We assume that several trade costs impede transactions at the international level: an
iceberg trade cost, a ﬁxed cost of exporting and a distribution cost.
First, we assume an iceberg trade cost    1 between Home and country , the desti-
nation country.   units of the good are produced and shipped but only one unit arrives at
destination.
Second, in order to export in country , a ﬁrm producing in the Home country must pay
a ﬁxed cost, speciﬁc to each destination (). We will characterize the speciﬁc form of this
ﬁxed cost when we analyze the eﬀect of exchange rates on the extensive margin of trade as
this speciﬁc form does not aﬀect the intensive margin of trade.
Finally, we assume that distribution (wholesale and retail) costs have to be paid in the
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destination country on the amount that reaches the destination. Distribution takes  units
of labor in country  per unit consumed in that country. Hence, we follow Tirole (1995), (p.
175) characterization of distribution: "production and retailing are complements". This
is the same assumption as in Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003) and Corsetti and Dedola
(2007). The wage paid in distribution is the same as in the production sector. We assume that
the cost of distribution does not depend on the idiosyncratic productivity of the ﬁrm. Again,
this means that the distribution costs are outsourced. Those costs are paid to an outside ﬁrm
that provides distribution services. If a French ﬁrm exports to the US, we therefore assume
that what it pays in distribution services (to wholesalers and retailers) does not depend
on its productivity. Any additive cost (transport, marketing, advertising, insurance...) -
not substitutable to production - paid in local currency and which does not depend on the
productivity of the exporter would have the same impact as the distribution costs we assume
here. Qualitatively, our results would remain if these distribution costs depended on the
ﬁrm’s productivity, as long as they react less to productivity than production costs.
In our model, the costs that depend directly on productivity are at the core of what
deﬁnes a ﬁrm and a product: these are the production costs and the share of the ﬁxed cost
of exporting that is borne in the country where the ﬁrm is located.
In units of currency of country , the consumer price  () of a variety  exported from
Home to country  is:
 () ≡
() 

+  (2)
where () is the producer price of the good exported to  expressed in Home currency.
 is the wage rate in country  and  is the nominal exchange rate between the Home
country and country  expressed as Home currency in units of  currency. An increase in 
is a depreciation in the Home currency vis a vis currency . The quantity demanded in  of
this variety is:
() = −1 [ ()]
− (3)
where  is the income of country  and  is the price index in country . The cost
(in units of currency of the Home country) of producing ()  units of good (inclusive of
transaction costs) and selling them in country  for a domestic ﬁrm with productivity  is:
() = () + () (4)
where  is the wage rate in the Home country.  will be more generally interpreted as a
measure of the performance of the ﬁrm that can aﬀect its sales and its presence on markets.
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The proﬁts (in units of currency of the Home country) of exporting this variety to country
 are therefore given by:
() = [()− ]()  − () (5)
2.2 Prices and the intensive margin
With monopolistic competition on the production side, the producer price () expressed
in Home currency of ﬁrm/variety  exporting to country  is higher than −1 , the standard
mark-up in the monopolistic competition model:
 () =

 − 1
µ
1 +

 
¶ 
 = ()

  (6)
where we call  ≡  the real exchange rate of the Home country with country .
The mark-up () over the marginal cost increases with the productivity of the ﬁrm and
the exchange rate6 . Due to high productivity and low producer prices, a large share of the
ﬁnal consumer price does not depend on the producer price so that the elasticity of demand
perceived by the producer is lower. The producer price can be rewritten as a function of
this perceived elasticity () :
 () =
()
()− 1

 where () =
  + 
  + 
 1 (7)
() is lower than , the elasticity in the standard monopolistic competition model. High
productivity ﬁrms (high ) have a lower elasticity which explains their higher mark-up. A
depreciation (higher ) also reduces the perceived demand elasticity which allows all ﬁrms
to increase their markup. High productivity ﬁrms, because they have a lower elasticity to
start with, can increase their markup more than others.
Note that the law of one price does not hold: the producer price of the same variety sold
in diﬀerent countries depends on the bilateral exchange rate, trade and distribution costs
and the wage rate of this country. The impact of a depreciation on the producer price is
given by the following elasticity, speciﬁc to each ﬁrm:
() =
()


()
=

  + 
(8)
6Bergin and Feenstra. (2000, 2001, 2009) show that producer mark-ups also increase with a depreciation
in a model with translog preferences. Atkeson and Burstein (2008) show the same result in a model with
quantity competition à la Cournot. In a model with decreasing returns to labor rather than the linear
production function we assume, ﬁrms would also react to a depreciation by increasing producer prices. This
is because their marginal costs increase with production. However, in the absence of distribution costs, the
elasticity of the producer price to exchange rate would not depend on productivity.
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Testable Prediction 1. The elasticity of the producer price, () to a real depreciation
(an increase in ) is positive and
i) increases with the productivity of the ﬁrm , the size of its exports and more generally
its performance on exports markets.
ii) increases with the importance of local distribution costs 
iii) increases with the level of the real exchange rate 
The mark-up increases with a depreciation because distribution costs involve some en-
dogenous pricing to market as explained by Corsetti and Dedola (2007). Firms partially
absorb some of the exchange rate change in the mark-up. (), which can be thought as a
measure of pricing to market, which here is heterogenous and increases with the productiv-
ity of the exporter. The productivity of a ﬁrm aﬀects positively the size of its exports and
the number of markets it exports to (see below). Hence, the elasticity of the producer price
to a real depreciation should increase with these measures of export performance. These
predictions also hold in a version of the model presented in appendix in which ﬁrms diﬀer
in the quality of the goods they export. In this case, ﬁrms that export higher quality goods
(and have higher value added per worker) react to a depreciation by a larger increase of
their producer price.
Firms that export in countries and sectors with higher distribution costs should react to
a real depreciation by increasing more their producer prices. This is because the elasticity
of demand perceived by the producer is lower on those markets.
Finally, the reason for prediction (iii) is that the share of the price aﬀected by the
exchange rate decreases with the exchange rate itself. In fact, a depreciation acts as a
productivity gain for all ﬁrms and — exactly as a productivity gain — it increases the share
of the distribution costs in consumer prices and reduces the elasticity of demand perceived
by the producer. The eﬀect of a real depreciation is therefore non linear.
The import price and the consumer price (expressed in the currency of country ) are:
 () =
() 

=

 − 1
µ  

+


¶
;  () =

 − 1
µ  

+ 
¶
(9)
so that there is incomplete pass-through of a depreciation at the level of both import
and consumer prices. Part of the lack of response of the consumer price to exchange rate
comes directly from the presence of local distribution costs and part comes from the change
in the mark-up of the producer as a response to the exchange rate change7 . The optimal
degree of pass-through on prices at the import and consumer levels are respectively:
7Hellerstein (2008) work on the beer market estimates that half of the lack of complete pass-through in
this market is due to changes in mark-up and half to local distribution costs.
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 ()


 ()
= −    + 
;
 ()


 ()
= −    + 
(10)
and decreases with both the importance of the distribution cost and the productivity of the
ﬁrm. Note that in our model, we do not consider the choice of currency of invoicing but
the optimal choice of the degree of pass-through is implicitly similar to such a choice. If the
elasticity in (10) for both the import and consumer price approaches -1, this is similar to
producer currency pricing. At the other extreme, if it approaches zero (for example, for very
high productivity ﬁrms and or distribution costs), this is similar to local currency pricing.
For an active exporter, the volume of exports increases with productivity:
() = −1
∙  

+ 
¸−
−
µ − 1

¶
(11)
where  is the ideal price index in country :
 =
Ã X
=1

Z ∞
∗
h 
 − 1
³
 +


´i1−
()
!−1(−1)
(12)
where  is the bilateral real exchange rate of country  and  and  the bilateral
trade cost. Note that as in Chaney (2008), we assume that the number of entrepreneurs
who get a productivity draw is proportional to the population size  in country  Only
ﬁrms with productivity above ∗ in country  can export in country . Note that  the
price index for country  depends on the bilateral exchange rates of country  with all its
trade partners. In this perfect price index, a measure of the eﬀective real exchange rate of
the country appears in the second part of the bracket (in a very non linear way). More
precisely, it is the weighted sum of real bilateral exchange rates of country  with all its
trading partners. The weights depend in particular on the number of exporters which is
proportional to the number of workers. Hence an eﬀective exchange rate appreciation of
country  that decreases  leads to a fall of the volume of exports from an exporter of the
Home country. We will assume that the Home country is too small for its bilateral exchange
rate to aﬀect the price index of country .
We can now analyze the impact of a change in the bilateral real exchange rate on the
volume of exports between the Home country and country , characterized by the following
elasticity, speciﬁc to each ﬁrm:
 () =
()


()
=
 
  + 
(13)
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Testable Prediction 2. The elasticity of the ﬁrm exports, () to a real depreciation
(an increase in ) is positive and
i) decreases with the productivity of the ﬁrm , the size of its exports and more generally
its performance on exports markets
ii) decreases with the importance of local distribution costs 
iii) decreases with the level of the real exchange rate 
The intuition of these predictions on export volumes comes directly from the intuition on
producer prices. Heterogenous absorption of real exchange rate movements into mark-ups
generates an heterogenous reaction of export volumes. Again, these results hold in a version
of the model presented in appendix in which ﬁrms diﬀer in the quality of the goods they
export.
The elasticity of the value of exports (in Home currency) to exchange rate change of a
ﬁrm with productivity  is the sum of the elasticities given in (8) and (13). It can be checked
that the elasticity of the value of exports to  decreases with the productivity of the ﬁrm
as long as   1 i.e. the relevant case in our model.
2.3 Proﬁts and the extensive margin
The equilibrium proﬁts for an active Home country exporter to country  can be shown to be:
() =
 ()()
 − () (14)
= − −1
∙  

+ 
¸1−
− ()
where  ≡ −( − 1)−1 is a constant. We now specify the ﬁxed export cost  (). We
assume that workers in both countries are employed to pay this ﬁxed cost which might be
interpreted as research and development, innovation, adaptation to the market or marketing
expenses. We assume that ﬁrms with higher productivity in production activities are also
more productive in activities (R&D, innovation, marketing expenses...) necessary to provide
the ﬁxed cost. The production function for the ﬁxed cost to export is more general than
in the existing literature because we allow for it to be partly incurred in the destination
country, for example in the case of marketing costs. It is expressed as a Cobb-Douglas in
labor of the Home country and labor in country , with shares  and 1−  respectively:
() = 
µ

¶
()1− = −1− (15)
where   0 This speciﬁcation implies that the productivity parameter that characterizes
the ﬁrm aﬀects its ﬁxed cost only in the country where production is located. Implicitly,
this means that the share of ﬁxed costs paid in the foreign country is outsourced.
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One can show that proﬁts increase with a real depreciation. Partly this is because sales
increase in country  and partly this is because the mark-up of exporting to country 
increases with the depreciation.
The threshold such that proﬁts of a ﬁrm ∗ exporting in  are zero is (implicitly) deﬁned
by the following cutoﬀ condition:
− −1
∙  
∗
+ 
¸1−
=  (∗)− (16)
Below the threshold productivity ∗ , ﬁrms are not able to export on market . Exporters are
higher productivity ﬁrms as in Melitz (2003). Given that we showed in the previous section
that higher productivity ﬁrms choose to absorb more of the exchange rate movements into
their mark-up, this implies that exporters are ﬁrms which, by selection, are less sensitive
(in terms of their export volumes) to exchange rate movements than other ﬁrms.
Note also that if we rank markets by their size or ﬁxed cost, higher productivity ﬁrms
will export to more markets.
Using equation (16), the elasticity of the threshold productivity to exchange rate move-
ments is:
∗ =
∗


∗
= −1 (17)
The threshold decreases with a depreciation because it allows ﬁrms that were not productive
enough to sell enough and be proﬁtable to enter the market. Given that a depreciation
reduces the productivity threshold, we should also observe that a depreciation reduces the
average productivity of ﬁrms exporting to this destination.
2.4 Aggregate exports
We denote () the cumulative distribution function of productivity (symmetric in all
countries). Hence, in quantity terms, aggregate exports from the Home country to country 
are given by the sum of all individual exports of ﬁrms with productivity above the threshold
∗ :
 =
∞Z
∗
()() =
∞Z
∗
−1
µ 
 − 1
¶− ∙  

+ 
¸−
() (18)
The elasticity of aggregate exports to exchange rate shocks can be decomposed into the
intensive and extensive elasticities as follows:




=



∞Z
∗
()

()
| {z }

− 
(∗ )0(∗ )×
∗
| {z }

(19)
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The ﬁrst term represents the increase in exports that comes from existing exporters. The
second term is the increase in exports due to entry of new exporters and is also positive (as
∗
  0).
We now want to check whether our model can broadly reproduce the low elasticity of
aggregate export to exchange rate movements. What are we attempting to replicate? In the
literature on the eﬀect of exchange rate on aggregate exports, a typical elasticity is around
unity or a bit above unity. As explained in the empirical section below, we ﬁnd a similar
elasticity, more precisely 111 (see column 1, table 7, section 3.4), for the French yearly
data we use. With ﬁrm level data and information on exports for each destination and for
each year, we can disentangle the change of aggregate exports that comes from existing
exporters for a speciﬁc destination and the change that comes from the entry or exit of
exporters on this destination8 . We can therefore compute the intensive and the extensive
margin elasticities. In column 1 of table 8 (section 3.4), we estimate the intensive elasticity
to be 088 for French exporters The extensive margin is therefore 023. These are the three
elasticities that we attempt to replicate in our model. Note that the extensive margin - even
though small in absolute value- is non negligible as it represents around 20% of the total
change in aggregate exports in the year following an exchange rate movement.
We assume a Pareto distribution for productivity of the form () = 1−−, () =
−−1 where  is an inverse measure of productivity heterogeneity. We calibrate the model
around a symmetric equilibrium where  =  ,  =   =  = 1.
Hence,




=

∞Z
∗
  [  + ]−−1 −−1
∞Z
∗
[  + ]− −−1
| {z }

+
[  + ∗]− ∗−
∞Z
∗
[  + ]− −−1
| {z }

(20)
It can be shown that9 :




=  (21)
8 In these estimations, we control for the GDP, GDP per capita as well as the eﬀective real exchange rate
of the destination country, a destination sector ﬁxed eﬀect as well as a year ﬁxed eﬀect.
9To see this, note that:
[  + ∗]− ∗− = 
∞
∗
 [  + ]−−1 −+ ( − )
∞
∗
[  + ]− −−1
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the same aggregate elasticity that Chaney (2008) obtains for the eﬀect of a fall in trade costs
 . However, the decomposition is diﬀerent from Chaney (2008). In his model, the intensive
elasticity is  and the extensive elasticity is  − . It can be shown that in our model, the
intensive elasticity is smaller than  and that the extensive elasticity is larger than  − .
We take a value of 12 for   so that iceberg trade costs are 20% Distribution costs are
assumed to be a constant share  of the average consumer price in country . Burstein,
Neves, and Rebelo (2003) provide evidence on the size of distribution margins using data for
two countries, the United States and Argentina, concluding that local distribution services
(expenditures on transport, wholesale and retail services, marketing, etc.) account for at
least half of the retail prices of consumer goods, and an even higher share of tradable
agricultural products. Goldberg and Verboven (2001) concluded that local costs account
for up to 35 percent of the price of a car. Goldberg and Campa (2008) report distribution
expenditure shares, which average 32 to 50 percent of the total cost of goods. We choose a
share  = 05 when we interpret local distribution costs as including all local costs. Note
that if we assume that part of the transport costs are additive and do not depend on the
exchange rate, this is similar to an increase in distribution costs in the model. We also report
the results for a stricter deﬁnition of distribution costs for which we choose a share of 03
The elasticity is evaluated around an equilibrium where ∗ is such that  (  ∗ ) =
(∗ ) = 08 so that 20% of ﬁrms in the Home country export to country , approximately
what is observed in France. Fixing the proportion of ﬁrms that export determines ∗ so that
the parameter  does not aﬀect the intensive or extensive elasticities as it does not aﬀect
the elasticity of the threshold productivity to the exchange rate (see equation (17)). Finally,
we assume that home country exporters have a negligible impact on the foreign country’s
price index10 .
The Pareto distribution parameter  has been estimated on French ﬁrms by Mayer
and Ottaviano (2007) using the methodology proposed by Norman, Kotz and Balakrishnan
(1994), and the results always range between 1.5 and 3. These estimations are for ﬁrms that
are either exporters and non exporters but with more than 20 employees. This last restriction
means that the relevant heterogeneity in our model is underestimated as our model does
not restrict ﬁrm size. When we use our own data - which also includes ﬁrms with less than
20 employees - to evaluate the Pareto distribution parameter, we get a number around one.
We thus choose  = 15 as a benchmark and report results for a lower value  = 1 and
higher value  = 2 For , the elasticity of substitution, we take as our benchmark a high
value of 7. In Romalis (2007) as well as in Imbs and Mejean (2008), and more generally
10Note that this assumption means that we overestimate the simulated elasticity.
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in studies using industry-level rather than macro data, elasticities of substitution between
domestic and foreign varieties are estimated to be between 4 and 13 in the case of Romalis.
In a standard monopolistic trade model, the elasticity of aggregate exports to exchange rate
movements is . A high value of  means that the predicted aggregate elasticity is much
too high. We want to see if our model is able to generate a low aggregate elasticity even
though we choose a high elasticity of substitution. We also report the results for  = 4
Note that contrary to the literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity (see Chaney (2008) for example),
our model does not restrict parameters such that    − 1. We can have low values of 
(high degrees of ﬁrm heterogeneity) because the size distribution of exports has ﬁnite mean
even with low values of  relative to  due the presence of local distribution costs which do
not depend on the productivity of the ﬁrm.
In table 1, we report the results of our calibration. In our benchmark calibration ( = 7;
 = 15;  = 05), we ﬁnd that both the intensive margin and the extensive margins are
low even though a bit higher than in the data. The exporter with the lowest productivity
∗ and the lowest export volume has the highest intensive elasticity (at around 1.5). The
other more productive and larger exporters have a lower elasticity. The aggregate elasticity
is  = 15 versus 1.11 in the data. Remember that in standard macro models without
distribution costs, heterogeneity, entry/exit, this elasticity would be equal to the elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, in this speciﬁc case 7, hence much too
high with respect to the observed 111 In a model such as Melitz (2003) or Chaney (2008)
with heterogeneity, entry and exit but without distribution costs, it is easy to check that
the intensive elasticity is , much too high also with respect to the observed 088. Hence, in
our model, distribution costs are key to produce a low intensive elasticity.
Increasing heterogeneity (with a lower ) means that both the intensive and extensive
margins fall. A Pareto parameter around 1 generates results very close to the data11 . Re-
member that in our data the Pareto parameter is actually estimated to be around 1. With
more heterogeneity, the intensive margin falls because a larger share of exports is made by
a few very productive and very large ﬁrms which prefer to increase their markup rather
than their export volumes following a depreciation. The extensive margin also falls because
ﬁrms that enter the export market following the depreciation are much less productive and
smaller than those already on the market so that their impact on the aggregate elasticity
is small. With a low level of heterogeneity (high value of ), the aggregate elasticity be-
comes very large and very diﬀerent from the data: heterogeneity of ﬁrms performance is a
11To replicate exactly the French data, we obviouly need to choose  = 111 With  = 7, a share of
distribution costs equal to 47% of the ﬁnal price enables us to exactly match the two elasticities.
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key ingredient to explain the low aggregate elasticity of export volumes to exchange rate
changes.
A lower elasticity of substitution  reduces the intensive elasticity. There are two opposite
eﬀects. On the one hand, ﬁrms have more incentive to price to market as their export
volumes respond less to a change in relative price (see equation (13)). On the other hand,
with a lower elasticity, more productive ﬁrms have a smaller export share and these are the
ﬁrms that react to a depreciation by increasing their mark-ups rather than their sales. The
extensive margin increases with a lower  The reason is that ﬁrms that enter following a
depreciation are less productive. With a low , this low productivity is not such a severe
disadvantage. Finally, when the share of distribution costs in consumer prices is lowered
to 03, the intensive margin increases but the extensive margin decreases. The ﬁrst result
comes from the fact that with lower distribution costs, pricing to market becomes less
proﬁtable. The second result comes from the fact that with lower distribution costs (which
do not depend on productivity), the productivity disadvantage of the new entrants is more
pronounced.
Table 1: Calibration of aggregate export elasticities to exchange rate
French data Benchmark  = 1  = 2  = 4 = 03
Intensive 088 116 084 141 080 143
Extensive 023 034 016 059 070 007
Total 111 15 10 20 15 15
Hence, overall these simulation results are consistent with the data. In particular, they
are much closer to the low observed intensive and extensive elasticities than what models
without heterogeneity or distribution costs would produce. The interaction of both ingre-
dients is key for our story. If exporters are selected and concentrated among the most
productive ﬁrms because of the presence of a ﬁxed cost to export, and there is suﬃcient
heterogeneity among ﬁrms, then exporters are ﬁrms for which export volumes are optimally
insensitive to exchange rate movements due to the presence of distribution costs. We claim
that this may explain why, at the aggregate level, the intensive elasticity of exports to ex-
change rate is small. Furthermore, with suﬃcient heterogeneity, ﬁrms that enter following
a depreciation are small so that their eﬀect in the aggregate is also small. Our model is
therefore able to rationalize the weak observed reaction of aggregate exports to exchange
rate movements. A key ingredient for this result to hold is the heterogeneity of ﬁrms in their
reaction to exchange rate movements. We test the empirical validity of this mechanism in
the next section.
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3 Empirics
3.1 Data
We test the predictions of the model using a large database on French ﬁrms. The data comes
from two diﬀerent sources:
1) the French customs for ﬁrm-level trade data, which reports exports for each ﬁrm, by
destination and year. This database reports the volume (in tones) and value of exports by 8-
digit product (combined nomenclature) and destination, for each ﬁrm located on the French
metropolitan territory. It does not report all export shipments. Inside the European Union
(EU), ﬁrms are required to report their shipments by product and destination country only
if their annual trade value exceeds the threshold of 150,000 euro. For exports outside the
EU all ﬂows are recorded, unless their value is smaller than 1000 euros or one ton. Even
though the database is not comprehensive, in practice, those thresholds only eliminate a
very small proportion of total exports.
2) A balance sheet dataset called BRN which contains other relevant ﬁrm-level infor-
mation, including ﬁrms’ total turnover, size, sector, and other balance-sheet variables. The
period for which we have the data is from 1995 to 2005. The BRN database is constructed
from mandatory reports of French ﬁrms to the tax administration, which are in turn trans-
mitted to INSEE (the French Statistical Institute). The customs database is virtually
exhaustive, while the BRN contains between 650,000 and 750,000 ﬁrms per year over the
period - around 60% of the total number of French ﬁrms. A more detailed description of the
database is provided by Biscourp and Kramarz (2002) and Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz
(2004). After merging the two sources, more than 90% of French exporters are still present
in the database. Finally, macroeconomic variables come from the Penn World tables and
the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
We restrict the sample in several ways. Given that we proxy the export price by the
export unit value (the ratio of the export value to volume to a speciﬁc destination), we
need to be sure that an increase in this export unit value does not come from an increase
in the number of products exported to a destination. We therefore choose to restrict our
analysis to single-product exporters for which this problem does not exist. However, as
our database also contains ﬁrm-level export information at the product-level (Combined
Nomenclature 8 Digits, 10,000 products), we also run robustness checks using product-
speciﬁc information on the entire sample. Second, the results presented here contain only
non Eurozone destinations, to focus on destinations characterized by a suﬃcient level of
17
variance of the real exchange rate. We have checked that our results are robust to the
inclusion of Eurozone destinations.
Table 2 contains some descriptive statistics. We only report information on positive
export ﬂows, i.e. only ﬁrms which export at least one time during the period appear here.
The total number of exporters is equal to 175,496, which corresponds to a number of ex-
porters per year comprised between 90,000 and 100,000. This lowest number demonstrates
the important turnover in the export market already emphasized, among others, by Das,
Robert and Tybout (2007). Restricting the sample to single product observations reduces
the number of observations but most of the exporters remain in the database (164,479) since
most of the exporters are single-product toward at least one destination/year. In the same
way, restricting the database to non Eurozone countries results in a moderated loss in the
number of exporting ﬁrms (148,356 in that case). Note also that ﬁrms in the restricted
sample are comparable to those of the entire sample in terms of value added per worker.
Nb. Obs. Nb firms Mean Median 1st quartile 3rd quartile
ALL OBSERVATIONS
Nb Employees 4010101 165993 260 36 11 120
VA / L 3931378 162154 81.65 51.99 37.87 111.05
Number of destinations 4248713 175496 14.8 12 5 22
Number of products by dest. 4248713 175496 4.03 2 1 4
SINGLE-PRODUCT OBS.
Nb Employees 1852521 154216 164 27 9 78
VA / L 1812482 150548 73.45 50.15 36.6 72.04
Number of destinations 1986168 164479 6.4 2 5 9
SINGLE-PRODUCT, NON EURO 
Nb Employees 1183693 138416  187.7 30 9 91
VA / L 1156355 135084 76.77 50.86 37.1 73.15
Number of destinations 1275684 148356 4.76 3 2 7
TABLE 2: DESCRIPTIVES STATISTICS
3.2 Firm-level Methodology
Our ﬁrst testable prediction is that ﬁrms of the Home country (France) react to a currency
depreciation by increasing their production price, and the more so the higher the perfor-
mance of the ﬁrm. Recall the expression of producer prices in Home currency (euro), (6)
for goods exported to country :
 () =

 − 1
µ
1 +

 
¶ 
 (22)
This expression depends on the elasticity of substitution , distribution costs  in the
destination country, the bilateral real exchange rate  =  , the performance of the ﬁrm
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, the wage rate in France , and bilateral variable trade costs  . We will estimate the
elasticity of prices with respect to variations in the real exchange rate, for which equation
(8) in our model gives
()


()
=

  + 

Our ﬁrst testable prediction is that this elasticity is increasing in , the level of the ﬁrms’
productivity.
We estimate the following reduced-form for producer prices (equation 22) proxied by the
ﬁrm-level destination speciﬁc export unit values ():
ln() = 0 ln(−1) + 1 ln() +  +  +  (23)
Firms are indexed by , and time by . −1 is ﬁrm ’s productivity in year − 1,  is
the average real exchange rate between France and country  during year . The inclusion
of ﬁrm-destination ﬁxed eﬀects (labeled ) enables to estimate a “pure” within eﬀect of
the exchange rate variation over time on prices charged by a ﬁrm on a speciﬁc market.
All unobservable time invariant characteristics of a ﬁrm on a speciﬁc market (such as time
invariant trade or distribution costs) are captured by these ﬁrm-destination ﬁxed eﬀects.
Year dummies () capture the overall evolution of French variables like the wage rate .
Robustness checks have been made, controlling for country-speciﬁc variables such as GDP
and GDP per capita as well as past values of the real exchange rate. The results are similar.
Equation (23) is estimated for two sets of ﬁrms: those under and those above the median
(computed by destination-year) performance variable, and we evaluate whether 1 is larger
for ﬁrms above the median , following testable prediction 112 .
Firm-level export volumes in equation (11) are given by:
() = −1 −
∙  

+ 
¸− µ − 1

¶
 (24)
with the associated elasticity (13)
()


()
=     + 

now a decreasing function of ﬁrm’s performance. We follow the same reduced form strategy,
as for unit values, estimating ﬁrm  exports to destination  in year  as:
ln = 0 ln(−1) + 1 ln() +  +  +  +  (25)
12This estimation could be done with interaction terms, but we prefer to let more ﬂexibility in the
estimation of other determinants of ﬁrms’ unit value.
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where  is a set of destination-year speciﬁc variables containing the following variables:
GDP, GDP per capita and eﬀective exchange rate. Indeed, export volumes (see 24) depend
on ,  and , i.e. on country ’s GDP, wage and its price index. The second is proxied
by GDP per capita, and the third by the country ’s eﬀective real exchange rate13 . As
for the price equation, we include ﬁrm-destination ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies. Again,
equation (25) is estimated for high and low performance ﬁrms separately, and we expect 1
to be smaller for high performance ﬁrms following testable prediction 2.
To assess the relevance of our price and volume elasticity predictions, we therefore es-
timate equations (23), and (25), on diﬀerent subsamples, deﬁned according to the level
of performance of the ﬁrm. More precisely, we run separate estimations for ﬁrms above
(respectively below) the median of , computed for each destination-year. Firms’ perfor-
mance  is proxied in diﬀerent ways: In addition to its contemporaneous TFP14 and labor
productivity (value added per worker), we use its TFP in − 2, the number of destinations
it exports to, and its total export volume. Each indicator is a proxy for the performance
of the ﬁrms as an exporter. In the model, it is easy to check that a ﬁrm with a higher 
will export to more destinations and will have a larger volume of exports to each of these
destinations.
Our theoretical framework also predicts that the exporting probability —  (  ∗ ) —
increases with an exchange rate depreciation. We thus estimate the exporting probability by
replacing the dependent variable of equation (25) a dependent variable which equals 1 when
the ﬁrm  exports to country  during year . We further estimate this equation under the
conditions −1 = 0 (ﬁrm  did not export in destination  in year − 1) and −1  0
to assess separately the eﬀect of exchange rate movements on entry decisions and on the
decision to stay on the export market.
3.3 Firm-Level Results
3.3.1 Intensive Margin
Tables 3 and 4 report the results of the estimations of unit values and export volumes. In
each table, we present in the ﬁrst column the results on the whole sample, before splitting the
sample according to the ﬁrm’s performance in the other estimations. The results are clear-
cut. Regarding unit values (Table 3), exchange rate changes have a positive eﬀect on prices
for the whole sample, as the model predicts (column (1)). Firms do react to an exchange
13The eﬀective exchange rate is computed from CEPII and IFS data as an average of the real exchange
rates of destination countries toward all its trade partners - including itself - weighted by the share of each
trade partner in the country’s total imports.
14We compute Total Factor Productivity with the Olley-Pakes (1996) methodology.
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rate depreciation (appreciation) by increasing (decreasing) their producer prices. However,
the sub-sample analysis shows that only high performers absorb part of the exchange rate
depreciation by increasing their producer prices. Firms which are above the median in terms
of performance react to a 1% depreciation by increasing their producer price between 0.14%
and 0.33% depending on the performance indicator. Low performers do not change their
unit values when exchange rates vary whatever the deﬁnition of performance.
The implications of this result on export volumes (Table 4) are also in line with our
theoretical predictions. On the whole sample (column (1)), the exchange rate has a positive
and signiﬁcant impact on individual export volumes. The eﬀect however varies importantly
across ﬁrms: it is signiﬁcantly positive for export volumes of low performers, whereas the
impact is not signiﬁcantly positive for high performance ﬁrms. Note that even among low
performers, the elasticity of export volumes to exchange movements is rather small, between
0.36 and 0.69. Consistently with our theoretical framework, high and low productivity
exporters clearly have a diﬀerent price and quantity strategies when faced with an exchange
rate change. As mentioned before, this eﬀect has interesting aggregate implications, since
exports are very concentrated toward high performers. In the next section we will indeed
show that the distribution of performance among exporters modiﬁes to a large extent the
response of aggregate export volumes to exchange rate movements.
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Dep. Var. : Unit Value (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Performance Indicator
Sub-sample All High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
TFP(t-1) 0.006 -0.02 0.024* 0.002 0.015 0.019* -0.005
(0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014)
Labor Productivity(t-1) -0.003 0.016
(0.013) (0.013)
TFP(t-2) 0.01 0.023
(0.020) (0.017)
RER 0.166*** 0.212** 0.004 0.333*** 0.151 0.185** 0.006 0.210*** -0.066 0.137* 0.143
(0.056) (0.088) (0.083) (0.102) (0.096) (0.090) (0.080) (0.064) (0.127) (0.071) (0.096)
Observations 159659 80947 78712 55860 54815 74312 85347 103116 56543 92105 67554
 Adj. R-squared 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.89
Dep. Var. : Export Volume (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Performance Indicator
Sub-sample All High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
TFP(t-1) 0.070*** 0.076** 0.044 0.039 0.080*** 0.094*** 0.033
(0.020) (0.031) (0.033) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)
Labor Productivity(t-1) 0.067** 0.063*
(0.032) (0.032)
TFP(t-2) 0.01 -0.033
(0.048) (0.047)
RER 0.333** 0.127 0.630*** -0.093 0.450** 0.341* 0.566*** -0.183 0.405*** 0.330* 0.531**
(0.130) (0.204) (0.207) (0.258) (0.229) (0.206) (0.204) (0.269) (0.155) (0.176) (0.209)
Effective RER -0.227*** -0.196 -0.279** -0.276* -0.329** -0.023 -0.363*** -0.097 -0.193* -0.218** -0.14
(0.081) (0.124) (0.136) (0.151) (0.149) (0.126) (0.131) (0.154) (0.101) (0.110) (0.131)
GDP 0.810* 0.768 0.816 0.905 2.585*** 1.084 0.548 1.889* 0.308 0.381 2.132***
(0.442) (0.666) (0.748) (0.918) (0.910) (0.666) (0.722) (1.042) (0.531) (0.589) (0.748)
GDP per capita 0.145 0.335 0.142 -0.125 -1.956** 0.005 0.391 -1.925* 0.814 0.594 -1.204
(0.450) (0.677) (0.768) (0.984) (0.955) (0.676) (0.742) (1.132) (0.524) (0.599) (0.763)
Observations 134958 68434 66524 45985 45154 62968 71990 52413 82545 77851 57107
 Adj. R-squared 0.86 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.85 0.87 0.86 0.84 0.76
All variables in logarithms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel, within estimations (firm-destination fixed effects) with year dummies. Sub-
samples  computed by destination-year, except for columns (8) and (9), computed by year.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All variables in logarithms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel, within estimations (firm-destination fixed effects) with year dummies. Sub-
samples  computed by destination-year, except for columns (8) and (9), computed by year.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 4 : EXCHANGE RATE AND EXPORT VOLUMES
TABLE 3 : EXCHANGE RATE AND UNIT VALUES
Export Volume
TFP TFP(t-2) Labor Productivity
TFP(t-2) Labor Productivity
Nb Destinations Export Volume
TFP Nb Destinations
We have also estimated (25) using individual export values instead of export volumes as
a dependent variable. As mentioned in the theoretical section, the elasticity of individual
export values to exchange rate is the sum of the elasticities on unit values and export
volumes, which approximately holds in the data. Moreover, the ﬁrst elasticity increases
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with productivity, while the second decreases with productivity. The total eﬀect is thus
less clear than on export volumes, but the model predicts that the total elasticity should
decrease with productivity as long as the elasticity of substitution between goods is larger
than unity. This is what Table 10 (in appendix) conﬁrms: the elasticity of the value of
exports to exchange rates is always lower for high than for low performers. As expected
from our theoretical framework, the diﬀerence is less striking than in Table 4, but generally
signiﬁcant.
We proceed to a set of robustness checks. First, we have so far only considered single-
product ﬁrms, since the analysis of unit values and export volumes for multi-product ﬁrms
is more diﬃcult to interpret. To control the robustness of our results to the use of the entire
sample of ﬁrms, we have estimated (23) and (25) at the product level. Results are presented
in Table 11, columns (1) to (6) (in the appendix)15 . The results are consistent with our two
main theoretical predictions on the diﬀerence of reaction of high and low performance ﬁrms
to exchange rate movements. Even though more precisely estimated, the diﬀerence between
the high and low subsamples is lower than with single product ﬁrms. This may be due to the
fact that our performance indicators - and therefore the sub-sample separation - are not at
the product-level. It may also be due to the fact that both low and high performance ﬁrms
react to an exchange rate depreciation by increasing the number of products they export to
a destination.
Finally, those results are not modiﬁed when considering a diﬀerent decomposition of
ﬁrms’ performance, based on the ﬁrst and last deciles rather than the median. Tables
11, columns (7) to (10) (in the appendix) show on the contrary that, as expected, the
use of deciles instead of median reinforces the diﬀerence of behavior between high and low
performers. We also checked that introducing lags of the exchange rate in the regressions
does not alter the ﬁrm-level results. In most regressions the lagged exchange rate is not
signiﬁcant which suggests that the eﬀects we document materialize during the year. This
is not true when we aggregate the results at the sector level (see Table 14 in appendix).
Lagged exchange rates are in some regressions signiﬁcant. These regressions at the sector
level also serve as a robustness check. When we split the sample between high and low
performance sectors (rather than high and low performance ﬁrms), we ﬁnd again that only
the low performance sectors react to an exchange rate depreciation by increasing their export
volumes16 .
15We only report in Table 11 results obtained using TFP as a perfomance indicator. Results using other
indicators are similar, and available upon request.
16This is consistent with Alexandre et al., (2009) who show that employment in high-technology sectors
are less aﬀected by changes in real exchange rates than low-technology sectors.
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3.3.2 The role of distribution costs and exchange rate non linearities
Our model emphasizes the diﬀerence in the response to exchange rate changes depending on
the export performance of ﬁrms, a feature we validated empirically in the former section. It
has additional predictions which we now bring to the data. First, it emphasizes the role of
distribution costs in deﬁning the optimal strategy of exporters to exchange rate movements.
Campa and Goldberg (2008) have shown on aggregate sectoral data that the insensitivity
of consumer prices to exchange rate movements depends crucially on distribution costs. We
use the data they constructed on distribution costs in 10 non Eurozone OECD countries in
28 sectors to analyze the role of distribution costs at the ﬁrm level. Equations (8) and (13)
show that ﬁrms exporting in sectors and countries with diﬀerent distribution costs (in the
model diﬀerent levels of ) should react diﬀerently to an exchange rate movement. Given
that there is little time variation and that several years are missing, we use the average of
Campa and Goldberg (2008) data on the period 1995-2001 to proxy for . A French ﬁrm
that exports in a sector and or country with higher distribution costs (as a percentage of the
consumer price) should increase more its producer price and should increase less its export
volume following a depreciation (see testable predictions 1 and 2, (ii)). Hence, our theoretical
framework predicts that the interaction term between real exchange rate and distribution
costs (sector and country speciﬁc) should be positive for the producer price equation and
negative for the export volume equation. Given that the distribution costs data is time
invariant and that we include ﬁrm-destination ﬁxed eﬀects, we choose to include interaction
terms rather than to split the sample according to distribution costs levels. Table 5, columns
1 and 2 show the results. Note ﬁrst that the sample is reduced due to the limited availability
of the distribution cost data. The coeﬃcients on the interaction between distribution costs
and exchange rate are, as predicted by the theory, positive and negative respectively for the
price and export volume equations. They are both signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The total
eﬀect of exchange rate on unit value that can be computed from estimation (1) ranges from
insigniﬁcant (in sectors / destinations in which distribution costs are close to zero) to 1 (in
sectors / destinations in which distribution costs are the highest). Firms therefore totally
price to market in the latter case.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Unit Value Export Vol.
Sub-sample All All High RER Low RER High RER Low RER
TFP(t-1) -0.004 0.121*** 0.009 0.018 0.076*** 0.103**
(0.013) (0.033) (0.012) (0.015) (0.029) (0.042)
RER -0.307 0.847* 0.326** 0.035 -0.333 0.882**
(0.211) (0.472) (0.128) (0.125) (0.284) (0.351)
RER*Distribution 1.910** -3.726**
(0.748) (1.625)
…
Observations 46222 39941 98654 81035 87397 65319
R-squared 0.91 0.87 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.87
specific controls not reported. Subsamples computed by destination.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 5 : DISTRIBUTION COSTS AND NON LINEAR EFFECT OF EXCHANGE RATE VARIATIONS
Unit Value Export volume
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel, within estimations (firm-destination fixed effects) with year dummies. Destination-
Another prediction of our theory is that the eﬀect of exchange rate changes is non
linear17 (see testable predictions 1 and 2, (iii)): a more depreciated exchange rate level (a
higher value of  in the model) is associated with a larger elasticity of producer prices and
in turn a lower elasticity of export volumes to exchange rate movements. In fact, a more
depreciated exchange rate level acts exactly like a positive productivity shock:  and  enter
the equations identically. To test this implication, we split the sample according to the level
of the exchange rate (above and below the median level, computed for each destination on
the period). Our results are presented in Table 5 (columns 3 to 6). They are in line with our
predictions: a more depreciated level of the exchange rate (high level of the real exchange
rate) leads ﬁrms to choose to increase their producer price rather than their export volumes.
The opposite is true for low levels of the exchange rate. This again is consistent with our
theoretical framework where lower costs coming from higher productivity or a depreciated
real exchange rate weaken the demand elasticity on the export market.
3.3.3 Alternatives
In this section we consider alternative theoretical explanations to our mechanism that focuses
on the interaction of distribution costs and heterogeneity in productivity. We consider
17Bussière (2007) tests for non linearities of exchange rate pass-through on export and import prices at
the aggregate level.
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whether our results are robust to four alternative explanations. Tables 12 and 13 in the
appendix contain the results.
A reason for high performance ﬁrms to increase their price following a depreciation may
be that marginal costs (and not mark-ups as in our story) increase with the depreciation,
and more so for the high productivity ﬁrms. This could be the case for two reasons.
(i) Imported Inputs. If the share of imported inputs in production is higher for high
performance ﬁrms, a depreciation of the euro may increase more their marginal cost of
production through increased import costs18 . Note that ﬁrm destination ﬁxed eﬀects control
only for the time invariant dependence of ﬁrms to the exchange rate as a marginal cost. The
French Customs report ﬁrm-level, destination-speciﬁc imports. Unfortunately, we only have
this data for the years 1995, 1998, 2001 and 2004. For the missing years, we use the
closest year for which the data is available. We then compute, as a proxy for imported
inputs, the ratio of imports of ﬁrm  from destination  divided by its total sales at year
. Alternatively, we have computed an index of input exposure using the diﬀerent import
destinations, weighted by bilateral exchange rate. The results are very similar. Columns
(1) to (4) in table 12 show that when controlling for the ﬁrm’s level of imported inputs, the
predicted diﬀerences between high and low productivity ﬁrms remain.
(ii) Decreasing returns. With decreasing returns in production, the marginal cost of
production increases when the ﬁrm’s exports rise due to the depreciation. High productivity
ﬁrms may be ﬁrms that use their inputs more eﬃciently and low productivity ﬁrms may have
unused inputs. In this case, high productivity ﬁrms would experience a higher increase of
marginal costs following a depreciation. We control for this second alternative by controlling
for a proxy of marginal costs under decreasing returns: we choose the level of sales of the
ﬁrm. Columns (5) to (8) in table 12 indicate that our results are robust to this inclusion.
(iii) Market power of the ﬁrm. Another alternative story, closer to our mechanism, is
the one proposed by Atkeson and Burstein (2008). In their theoretical model, only ﬁrms
with a large market power price to market, because these ﬁrms have a lower perceived
demand elasticity. We control for this market power eﬀect by controlling for the share of
the ﬁrm’s exports to a country in the total French exports to this destination-sector (NES
classiﬁcation, 36 sectors). Columns (1) to (4) in table 13 indicate that our results are robust
to this inclusion.
(iv) Competition intensity. Finally, another possibility is that when we split the sample
between low and high productivity ﬁrms, we in fact split between sectors with high and
low competition (a high competition in our model is captured by a high level of ). Note
18This argument is made for example by Dekle et al. (2007)
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that our price elasticity equation (8) reveals that the response to exchange rate should be a
decreasing function of competition intensity (and vice-versa for volumes, see equation (13)
), which means that a bias would occur in our estimates if high competition industries were
systematically associated with lower productivity levels. We can control for this possibility
by splitting ﬁrms in our sample according to the median level of productivity inside each
sector for each destination year rather for each destination year as in our main speciﬁcation.
Columns (5) to (8) in table 13 show that the role of productivity diﬀerences in the reaction
of ﬁrms to an exchange rate change is not weakened.
3.3.4 Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dep. Var. P(X>0) P(X>0) P(X>0) P(X>0) P(X>0) P(X>0) P(X>0) P(X>0) P(X>0)
Condition All X(T-1)=0 X(T-1)=1 All X(T-1)=0 X(T-1)=1 All X(T-1)=0 X(T-1)=1
Labor Productivity(t-1) 0.228*** 0.076*** 0.324*** 0.053*** 0.012*** 0.062*** 0.183*** 0.132*** 0.266***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0,005) (0,007) (0,011)
RER 0.898*** 1.258*** 1.154*** 0.199*** 0.180*** 0.244*** 1.582*** 1.186*** 2.009***
(0.033) (0.052) (0.060) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0,045) (0,061) (0,094)
GDP  -0.489***  -0.073 1.224***  -0.123***  -0.015  0.240*** -1.146*** -0.960*** 1.501***
(0.113) (0.178) (0.197) (0.026) (0.026) (0.040) (0,157) (0,215) (0,403)
GDP per capita 1.648*** 1.234***  -0.450** 0.382*** 0.188*** 0.070* 3.072*** 2.878*** 0,33
(0.112) (0.175) (0.194) (0.025) (0.026) (0.040) (0,154) (0,211) (0,401)
Effective RER 0.012  -0.110*** 0.045  0.004  0.016  0.029 -0,021 0.097** 0.465***
(0.021) (0.034) (0.178) (0.005) (0.030) (0.035) (0,029) (0,039) (0,064)
Marginal effects (1)
Labor productivity(t-1) 0.054*** 0.012*** 0.065*** 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.064***
RER 0.214*** 0.193*** 0.231*** 0.331*** 0.266*** 0.509***
Observations 2430544 1482033 948511 2430544 1482033 948511 1418476 825367 322999
Estimation
Robust standard errors in parentheses.All estimations include destination fixed effects and year dummies.  (1) Marginal effects computed 
at means. Linear estimations for FE Logit estimations.* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 6 : EXCHANGE RATE AND EXPORTING DECISIONS
Probit OLS FE Logit
Table 6 reports the results on ﬁrms’ exporting probability. The ﬁrst panel (columns 1 to
3) reports probit estimates whereas the second panel (columns 4 to 6) report linear probabil-
ity model (LPM) estimates and the third panel a logit estimation with ﬁrm destination ﬁxed
eﬀects19 . As predicted by the theory, productivity and exchange rate both have a positive
impact. A 10% depreciation increases the exporting probability by 2.1% (see column 1); the
eﬀect is signiﬁcant both on the entry probability, which increases by 1.9% (see column 2)
19The marginal eﬀects reported in this case are computed with a linear estimation.
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, and on the probability of remaining an exporter which increases by 2.3% (see column 3).
The results are similar with the linear speciﬁcation and larger with the ﬁxed eﬀct logit one.
These results contrast with those of Greenaway et al. (2007) who ﬁnd no eﬀect of exchange
rate changes on entry decisions. This suggests that using destination-speciﬁc information
(which they do not) enables us to estimate more precisely the eﬀect of exchange rates on
the extensive margin. Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, we have checked that no
delayed eﬀect of exchange rate movements can be detected on entry and exit decisions.
3.4 Aggregate results
Our model predicts that the heterogeneity of response to exchange rate movements and the
distribution of productivity (or more generally performance) among exporters is crucial to
understand the aggregate eﬀect of those exchange rate movements. If the mechanism at
work in our theoretical framework is valid, then sectors for which exports are concentrated
on a few high performers should be those also for which total sector export volumes are least
sensitive to exchange rate movements. There are two reasons for this in our theoretical model.
First, the extensive margin is reduced in more heterogenous sectors. The reason is that in
sectors with high performance heterogeneity, ﬁrms that enter following a depreciation are
much less productive and smaller than existing ones. Second, in our framework, performance
heterogeneity also reduces the intensive margin. The reason is that in sectors with high
performance heterogeneity, exports are concentrated on a few very productive ﬁrms. We have
shown (theoretically and empirically) that the exports of those ﬁrms are more insensitive to
exchange rate movements.
By analyzing how diﬀerent sectors react diﬀerently to an exchange rate depreciation we
can therefore better understand the aggregate implications of the mechanisms we study.
To do this, we aggregate the volume of exports by sector / destination and estimate its
reaction to exchange rate variations. We aggregate ﬁrm export ﬂows at the NES 36 level,
i.e. into 36 sectors. Our estimated equation takes the form:
ln = 1 ln + 2 ln−1 + 3 +  +  +  (26)
where  is the sector and  the destination.  is the same vector of country-speciﬁc controls
than in equation (25): GDP, GDP per capita and eﬀective exchange rate. We introduce a
lagged term of the exchange rate to capture the whole eﬀect of exchange rate on exports,
since, contrary to the ﬁrm level estimations, this lag is often signiﬁcant here.
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Dep. Var. : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sectoral Export Volume
Sectoral Indicator
Sub-sample Whole Sample High Low High Low High Low
RER 0.903*** 0.753*** 1.133** 0.501** 1.319*** 0,044 1.115***
(0,218) (0,183) (0,446) (0,215) (0,309) (0,535) (0,240)
RER(t-1) 0,206 0.490** -0,24 0,349 -0,037 0,005 0.523**
(0,215) (0,211) (0,388) (0,261) (0,293) (0,355) (0,233)
GDP 1.469*** 1.505*** 1.345** 1.189*** 1.187*** 1.622*** 1.353***
(0,329) (0,325) (0,630) (0,383) (0,452) (0,558) (0,462)
…
Total effect of RER 1.111*** 1.244*** 0.895* 0.850*** 1.282*** 0,050 1.640***
(0,290) (0,287) (0,537) (0,292) (0,390) (0,541) (0,376)
Observations 8041 4789 3550 4152 3889 3670 4371
R-squared 0,96 0,97 0,96 0,96 0,97 0,96 0,97
Robust standard errors in parentheses.All estimations include sector-destination fixed effects and year dummies. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 7 : EXCHANGE RATE AND EXPORT VOLUMES, AGGREGATED
κ (Pareto Shape) 10% bigger 10% more productive
Table 7 reports the results. First, the total eﬀect of real exchange rate changes on the
whole sample is found to be a bit above unity, 111, the number we attempted to replicate
in the theoretical section. There are however large disparities across sectors. In columns (2)
to (7) we split the sample according to the relative position of the sector exporters for each
destination and year. More precisely, for each sector we estimate the Pareto parameter,
and the share of the 10% largest and most productive exporters. For the Pareto shape,
we estimate a Pareto distribution based on the methodology provided by Norman, Kotz
and Balakrishnan (1994) (see also Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). High and Low represent,
as in tables 3 and 4, above and below the median of these indicators. Here again, the
results conﬁrm the theoretical predictions: more heterogenous sectors have a lower elasticity
of export volumes to exchange rate movements. This is true whether a high degree of
heterogeneity is proxied by a low Pareto shape  (columns 2 and 3) a high share of the 10%
largest ﬁrms (columns 4 and 5) or most productive ones (columns 6 and 7).
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The low reaction of exports found at the aggregate level may both come from the low
elasticity of the intensive margin (existing exporters) or the low response of the extensive
margin (entrants). The mechanism stressed in this paper mainly relies on the eﬀect of
heterogeneity on the intensive margin: when existing exporters are high performance ﬁrms,
their export sales react less to exchange rates. This is especially true in those sectors where
ﬁrms selection is stronger, i.e. where ﬁrms are very good performers and sectors with more
heterogeneity. In table 8 we estimate the eﬀect of exchange rate on the intensive margin
only, i.e. the volume of exports of ﬁrms that exported in − 1. It is estimated to be 088,
again a number we tried to replicate in the theoretical section. Results found in table 8 also
support the hypothesis that heterogeneity matters for the intensive margin: the elasticity of
the intensive margin to real exchange rate changes is found to be signiﬁcant only in sectors
where productivity is suﬃciently homogenous. This is consistent with our main story:
the aggregate eﬀect of exchange rate movements is low because exporting requires a high
productivity, an attribute which in turn gives an incentive to ﬁrms to react to an exchange
rate depreciation by increasing the export price rather than their sales. Heterogeneity also
implies that a large share of exports is concentrated on these high productivity ﬁrms.
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Dep. Var
RER
RER(t-1)
GDP
…
Total effect of RER 
Observations
R-squared
All variables in logarithms. Robust standard errors in parentheses.All estimations include sector-destination 
TABLE 9: EXCHANGE RATE, NUMBER OF EXPORTERS AND MEAN VOLUME OF SHIPMENT
(2)
fixed effects and year dummies. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
0.420
8041
0.93
(0.290)
0.96 0.99
8041
(0.059)
8041
(0.329)
1.111*** 0.691***
(0.068)
Number of Exporters
(1)
0.147***
(3)
0.059
0.903***
 Total export volume
0.738***
(0.043)
(0.057)
0.544***
Mean Vol. of Shipment
(0.285)
(0.218)
(0.322)
0.359*
(0.213)
0.731**1.469***
(0.215)
0.206
(0.204)
In Table 9 we decompose the total volume of exports into an extensive and an intensive
margin using a more traditional deﬁnition, i.e. the number of exporters and the mean
volume of shipment. Whereas the number of exporters is expected to increase with the
exchange rate, this is less clear for the mean volume of shipment, since entrants following a
depreciation should be less productive and smaller than existing exporters. This is indeed
what our results, presented in Table 9, suggest: only the number of ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly
aﬀected by the exchange rate. The mean volume of shipments remains unaﬀected by a
change in the exchange rate. Given that we have seen that a depreciation fosters entry, this
shows that entrants are smaller than existing ﬁrms.
4 Conclusion
This paper documents how exporters react to exchange movements. High performance ﬁrms
react to a bilateral depreciation by increasing their destination speciﬁc export price. They
therefore partially absorb exchange rate movements in their mark-up. This also means they
price to market. They choose this strategy rather than letting the import price fall and
increase their export sales. Low performance ﬁrms choose the opposite strategy. A simple
model that features this heterogeneity in reaction is presented where the main feature is
the interaction of heterogeneity in productivity and the presence of distribution costs in the
destination country. These distribution costs reduce the demand elasticity to a larger extent
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for high performers than for low performers.
We show that the diﬀerence in reaction to exchange rate movements is very robust for
French exporters. To our knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to document this fact and more
generally it the ﬁrst to use a very rich ﬁrm-level dataset to analyze how ﬁrms react to
exchange rate movements in their choice of prices, of quantities, of exit and entry.
This heterogeneity is interesting in itself but it also has important implications for the
impact of exchange rates on exports at the aggregate level. The mechanism that we document
can explain the low aggregate elasticity of export volumes to exchange rate movements: The
bulk of exports is made by high performance ﬁrms which we show optimally prefer to absorb
exchange rate movements in their mark-up. Heterogeneity therefore matters for the intensive
margin. It also matters for the extensive margin because ﬁrms that enter the export market
following the exchange rate movement are less productive and smaller than existing ones.
Our mechanism is based on the presence of three features: the heterogeneity of ﬁrms, the
presence of ﬁxed costs to export and of local costs that can be interpreted as distribution
costs. It is not based on any assumption of price rigidity. We believe therefore that it is
quite general. We however have not explored how this mechanism would work in a general
equilibrium framework in particular one in which exchange rate movements are endogenous
as in Corsetti and Dedola (2005), Ghironi and Melitz (2005) or Atkeson and Burstein (2008).
Our results have implications for the import pass-through literature which we have not
fully explored because we have focused on the export side of the story which is absent in
the recent literature on pass-through using disaggregated data. Our results suggest that the
low level of pass-through of exchange rate movements into import and consumer prices and
maybe its fall over time can, at least partially, be explained by the mechanism at work in
our model (for an explanation of the fall of pass-through over time see, Bergin and Feenstra
(2009)). Exporters, because of the presence of ﬁxed costs to export, are high performance
ﬁrms which optimally choose a low degree of pass-through. If high performance ﬁrms are
over-represented in the imports of a country and therefore in its import price index, then the
mechanism we have analyzed should also explain the low degree of pass-through we observe.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Heterogenous quality
We present a version of the model where ﬁrms diﬀer in terms of quality. This generates
similar empirical predictions as long as higher quality goods have higher distribution costs
and quality increases quickly enough with the cost of production so that the higher quality
ﬁrms have higher operating proﬁts. As shown by Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), this is the
empirically relevant case The quality part of this version of the model is similar to Baldwin
and Harrigan (2007). Utility is:
() =
⎡
⎣
Z

[()()]1−1 
⎤
⎦
1
1−1
(27)
where () is the consumption of variety . and () is the level of quality. Higher quality
goods have higher marginal costs in the form: () =
³


´
so that they are associated
with a low  The relevant case where proﬁts increase with quality is   1 so this is the
assumption we retain. We also assume that higher quality goods have higher distribution
costs: () The demand for variety  is:
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() = −1
∙() 
()
+ 
¸−
(28)
The optimal producer price  (expressed in Home currency) of ﬁrm/variety  exported
in country  is:
 () =

 − 1
µ
1 +
()
 
¶ 
 (29)
so that higher quality goods have higher markups. For an active exporter, the volume
of exports is:
() = −1
∙ 
()
  + 
¸− µ − 1

¶
(30)
We can now analyze the impact of a change in bilateral real exchange rates on the
optimal producer price:
 ()


 ()
=
()
  + ()
(31)
and on the volume of exports:
()


()
=     + ()
(32)
The elasticity of the producer price to an exchange rate change increases with the quality of
the good it produces and therefore with the value added per worker, as long as   1, the
relevant case. The elasticity of the volume of exports to an exchange rate change decreases
with the quality of the good it produces and its value added per worker.
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5.2 Robustness checks
Dep. Var. : Export value (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Performance Indicator
Sub-sample All High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low
TFP(t-1) 0.080*** 0.059** 0.078*** 0.055** 0.086*** 0.095*** 0.039
(0.018) (0.027) (0.030) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.029)
Labor Productivity(t-1) 0.068** 0.084***
(0.029) (0.029)
TFP(t-2) 0.031 -0.006
(0.043) (0.042)
RER 0.462*** 0.332* 0.542*** 0.213 0.536** 0.496*** 0.502*** -0.27 0.609*** 0.308* 0.463**
(0.112) (0.175) (0.182) (0.218) (0.210) (0.176) (0.176) (0.234) (0.134) (0.166) (0.183)
Effective RER -0.069 -0.028 -0.092 -0.089 -0.161 0.094 -0.17 0.098 -0.101 0.014 -0.114
(0.069) (0.104) (0.116) (0.126) (0.129) (0.106) (0.111) (0.132) (0.085) (0.097) (0.114)
GDP 0.591 0.847 0.498 0.601 2.086** 1.149* 0.164 2.110** 0.243 0.504 0.815
(0.386) (0.587) (0.654) (0.803) (0.818) (0.591) (0.628) (0.880) (0.464) (0.524) (0.660)
GDP per capita 0.4 0.29 0.523 0.174 -1.286 0.069 0.809 -1.866* 0.911** 0.584 -0.152
(0.394) (0.597) (0.669) (0.853) (0.861) (0.600) (0.644) (0.954) (0.459) (0.536) (0.672)
Observations 134958 68434 66524 45985 45154 62968 71990 52413 82545 72655 62303
Adj. R-squared 0.76 0.78 0.75 0.8 0.77 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.76 0.77 0.63
All variables in logarithms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel, within estimations (firm-destination fixed effects) with year dummies. Sub-
samples  computed by destination-year, except for columns (8) and (9), computed by year.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TFP TFP(t-2) Labor Productivity Nb Destinations Export Volume
TABLE 10: EXCHANGE RATE AND EXPORT VALUES
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable
Performance Indicator: TFP
Sub-sample All  High Low All  High  Low 10% High 10% Low 10% High 10% Low
TFP(t-1) 0.016*** 0.024*** 0.008** 0.062*** 0.038*** 0.132*** 0.009 0.012 -0.009 -0.016
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.037) (0.043)
RER 0.157*** 0.205*** 0.110*** 0.272*** 0.312*** 0.489*** 0.227* -0.227 0.121 0.893**
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.059) (0.067) (0.069) (0.125) (0.183) (0.304) (0.422)
…
Observations 1046447 525545 520902 891184 447378 443806 23779 15073 19851 13239
Adj. R-squared 0.78 0.94 0.92 0.58 0.88 0.85 0.95 0.92 0.9 0.86
Destination-specific controls not reported. Subsamples computed by destination-year.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
PRODUCT LEVEL DECILE DECOMPOSITION
Unit Value Export volume
TABLE 11: ROBUSTNESS: PRODUCT LEVEL AND DECILE DECOMPOSITION
Export volumeUnit value
All variables in logarithms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel, within estimations (firm-destination fixed effects) with year dummies. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ALTERNATIVE
Dependent Variable
Performance Indicator: TFP
Sub-sample High Low High Low High Low High Low
TFP(t-1) -0,019 0.024* 0.067* 0,05  -0.027** 0.024* 0,034 0,027
(0,012) (0,013) (0,030) (0,034) (0,013) (0,013) (0,031) (0,033)
RER 0.225** 0,004 0,107 0.631*** 0.211** 0,004 0,12 0.628***
(0,088) (0,083) (0,204) (0,208) (0,088) (0,083) (0,204) (0,207)
Imports / Total Sales -0,016 0,058 0,038 -0,093
(0,054) (0,044) (0,105) (0,102)
Total Sales 0.054*** -0,002 0.334*** 0.230***
(0,018) (0,011) (0,040) (0,029)
Observations 80400 78032 68017 66018 80947 78712 68434 66524
R-squared 0,92 0,91 0,87 0,85 0,93 0,91 0,87 0,85
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ALTERNATIVE
Dependent Variable
Performance Indicator: TFP
Sub-sample High Low High Low High Low High Low
TFP(t-1) -0,02 0.024* 0.066** 0,044 -0,011 0,02 0.078** 0,036
(0,013) (0,013) (0,030) (0,033) (0,013) (0,013) (0,032) (0,033)
RER 0.215** 0,004 0,328 0.651*** 0.192** 0,047 0,207 0.634***
(0,088) (0,083) (0,201) (0,205) (0,092) (0,085) (0,210) (0,213)
Share of French Exports 0,248 -0,081 21.100*** 27.365***
(0,288) (0,414) (2,407) (6,303)
Observations 81568 78091 68970 65988 80947 78712 68434 66524
R-squared 0,93 0,91 0,88 0,85 0,93 0,91 0,87 0,85
All variables but "Share of french exports" in logarithms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel, within estimations (firm-
with year dummies. Sub-samples computed sector-destination-year for columns (5) to (8) * significant at 10%; **  5%; ***  1%
 Unit Value Export Volume  Unit Value Export Volume
TABLE 13 : ROBUSTNESS: ALTERNATIVES (2)
MARKET POWER COMPETITION INTENSITY
TABLE 12 : ROBUSTNESS: ALTERNATIVES (1)
IMPORTED INPUTS DECREASING RETURNS
 Unit Value Export Volume  Unit Value Export Volume
All variables but Imports/Total Sales in logarithms. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Panel, within estimations (firm-destination 
with year dummies. Sub-samples computed by destination-year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Dep. Var. : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sectoral Export Volume
Sectoral Indicator
Sub-sample High Low High Low High Low High Low
RER 1.147*** 0.709** 1.056*** 0.711*** 0.969** 0.480* 0.850* 0.484*
(0.365) (0.277) (0.361) (0.269) (0.431) (0.289) (0.441) (0.281)
RER(t-1) -0.511 0.812*** -0.345 0.728*** -0.304 0.541* 0.000 0.445*
(0.342) (0.268) (0.353) (0.262) (0.363) (0.277) (0.394) (0.269)
GDP 1.173** 1.467*** 1.318** 1.491*** 1.701*** 1.370*** 1.825*** 1.445***
(0.514) (0.416) (0.521) (0.428) (0.579) (0.454) (0.587) (0.477)
…
Total effect of RER 0.636 1.521*** 0.711 1.440*** 0.665 1.021*** 0.850 0.930***
(0.451) (0.365) (0.460) (0.380) (0.491) (0.381) (0.544) (0.395)
Observations 4002 4074 4005 4073 4001 4074 4004 4073
R-squared 0.97 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.96 0.97
All variables in logarithms. Robust standard errors in parentheses.All estimations include sector-destination 
Mean Productivity Median Productivity Mean Productivity Median Productivity
All firms All firms Existing Exporters Existing Exporters
fixed effects and year dummies. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 14: EXCHANGE RATE, PRODUCTIVITY AND EXPORT VOLUMES, AGGREGATED 
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